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Robust optimality of linear saturated control in uncertain linear
network flows
Fabio Bagagiolo and Dario Bauso
Abstract— We propose a novel approach that, given a linear
saturated feedback control policy, asks for the objective func-
tion that makes robust optimal such a policy. The approach is
specialized to a linear network flow system with unknown but
bounded demand and politopic bounds on controlled flows. All
results are derived via the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs and viscosity
theory.
Keywords: Optimal control, Robust optimization, Inventory
control, Viscosity solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of driving a continuous time state
z(t) ∈ IRm within a target set T = {ξ ∈ IRm : |ξ| ≤
ǫ} in a finite time T ≥ 0 with ǫ ≥ 0 a-priori chosen
and keeping the state within T from time T on. Such a
problem is shortly referred to as the ǫ-stabilizability problem
of z(t). Define u(t) ∈ IRm the controlled flow vector,
w(t) ∈ IRn an Unknown But Bounded (UBB) exogenous
input (disturbance/demand) with n < m, and let D ∈ Rn×m
a given matrix, U = {µ ∈ IRm : u− ≤ µ ≤ u+} and
W = {η ∈ Rn : w− ≤ η ≤ w+} be two hyper-boxes with
assigned u+, u−, w+ and w−. Also, let σ be a binary state
such that σ(t) = 0 if z(t) 6∈ T and σ(t) = 1 if z(t) ∈ T .
The robust counterpart of the problem takes on the form
min
u∈U
max
w∈W
J(ζ, u(.), w(.)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−λ(σ)tgσ(z(t), u(t))dt (1)
z˙(t) = u(t)−Dw(t), z(0) = ζ for all t ≥ 0 (2)
z(t) ∈ T for all t ≥ T , (3)
where we denote by U = {u : [0,+∞[→ U} and by
W = {w : [0,+∞[→ W} the sets of measurable controls
and demands respectively. From a game theoretic standpoint
we will consider two players, player 1 playing u and player
2 playing w. The state z(t) has initial value ζ and integrates
the discrepancy between the controlled flow u(t) and Dw(t)
as described in (2). Controls u(t) and demand w(t) are
bounded within hyperboxes by their definitions. Condition
(3) guarantees the reachability of the target set from time T
on. Among all controls satisfying the above conditions (call it
admissible controls or solution), we wish to find the one that
minimizes the objective function (1) under the worst demand.
The objective function is defined on an infinite horizon with
discount factor e−λ(σ)t depending on σ. The reason for such
a dependency on σ will be clearer later on. The integrand
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in (1) is a function of z and u and its structure depends on
σ as follows
gσ(z(t), u(t)) =
{
g˜(z(t), u(t)) if σ = 0 (z(t) 6∈ T )
gˆ(z(t), u(t)) if σ = 1 (z(t) ∈ T )
(4)
where g˜(.) and gˆ(.) have to be designed as explained below.
In a previous work [2], it has been shown that under certain
conditions on the matrix D (recalled below), the following
(linear) saturated control policy drives the state z within T :
u(t) = sat[u−,u+](−kz(t)) :=
:=
(
sat[u−,u+](−kz1(t)), ..., sat[u−,u+](−kzn(t))
)
∈ IRn,
(5)
with k > 0 and where
sat[α,β](ξi) =


β, if ξi > β,
ξi, if α ≤ ξi ≤ β,
α, if ξi < α.
Then, we deduce that the saturated control policy returns an
admissible solution for problem (1)-(3). In the light of this
consideration, we focus on the following problem.
Problem 1: We wish to design the integrand gσ(.) of the
objective function (1) in (4) such that the saturated control
turns optimal for the min-max problem (1)-(3).
A. Literature and main results
In this work, we add new results concerning the optimality
of the saturated control policy, which is proved to solve the
ǫ-stabilizability problem in [2]. Our interest for the saturated
control is also due to the fact that it represents the simplest
form of a piece-wise linear control [6]. The idea of modeling
the demand as unknown but bounded variable is in line
with some recent literature on robust optimization [3], [5],
[10] though the “unknown but bounded” approach has a
long history in control [4]. The conservative approach of
Section V reminds the Soyster decomposition [12], used
in robust linear programming. Also, the notion of feedback
in control, present in this work, reminds the notion of
recourse used in robust optimization [7]. Concerning the
nature of the problem, we wish to emphasize our reversed
perspective: given a solution (the saturated control policy) we
ask for the objective function that makes the solution optimal.
Similarly to the dual mode control in [11] we provide a
solution approach which decomposes the problem into two
subproblems, within and without a predefined neighborhood
of the origin. All results are derived via the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman and Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations and
the related viscosity solutions theory (see Bardi-Capuzzo
Dolcetta [1] as a general reference).
B. Some basic facts about Hamilton-Jacobi equations, opti-
mal control and differential games
A Hamilton-Jacobi equation is a first order partial differ-
ential equation of the form
F (x, v(x),∇v(x)) = 0 in Ω,
where Ω ⊆ IRm, is open, F : Ω × IR × IRm → IR is
continuous. A viscosity solution of it is a continuous function
v : Ω → IR such that, for every x ∈ Ω and for every
differentiable function ϕ : Ω → IR, the following holds
i) x is local max for v − ϕ ⇒ F (x, v(x),∇ϕ(x)) ≤ 0;
ii) x is local min for v − ϕ ⇒ F (x, v(x),∇ϕ(x)) ≥ 0.
The idea is hence to substitute the derivatives of v, which
usually do not exist, with the derivatives of the test function
ϕ, and to require that the equation is ”semi-verified” in
the point of maximum for v − ϕ and (oppositely) ”semi-
verified” in the point of minimum for v − ϕ. If a function
satisfies i) only (for every test functions) then it is called a
subsolution, whereas it is called a supersolution in the other
case. Such a notion of solution goes back to Crandall-Evans-
Lions [8]. Obviously, this is a weak definition of solution,
and in particular, if a function v is a classical solution (i.e. it
is differentiable and satisfies the equation by equality), then
it is also a viscosity solution.
Let us consider an optimal control problem
max
β
J(x, β)
(
= max
β
∫ ∞
0
e−tℓ(y(t), β(t))dt
)
,
subject to y˙(t) = f(y(t), β(t)), y(0) = x,
where β : [0,+∞[→ B is the measurable control, with B
a compact set. Under rather general hypotheses, the value
function of the problem, U(x) = supβ J(x, β), is a viscosity
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
U(x) + min
b∈B
{−f(x, b) · ∇U(x)− ℓ(x, b)} = 0.
Such an equation holds in the whole IRm if the control
problem is without state-constraints (i.e. the state y(·) is free
to move in IRm); otherwise, if the problem is confined in the
closure Ω of an open set Ω, the equation must be coupled
with suitable boundary conditions on ∂Ω, usually given by
an exit cost ψ from Ω. The problem is then
max
β
J(x, β)
(
= maxβ
∫ tx(β)
0
e−tℓ(y(t), β(t))dt+
+e−tx(β)ψ(y(t))
)
,
where tx(β) is the first exit time from Ω for the trajectory
starting from x with control β (with the convention tx(β) =
+∞ if the trajectory never exit from Ω).
Under some hypotheses on the regularity of ∂Ω and
on the existence of inner suitable fields on the points of
the boundary, the value function turns out to satisfy the
boundary condition U = ψ in the so-called ”viscosity
sense”. This means that on the point x of the boundary
which are of local maximum (respectively local minimum)
for U − ϕ (when restricted to the closure of Ω), we must
have U(x) ≤ ψ(x) (resp. U(x) ≥ ψ(x)) or U(x) +
minb∈B {−f(x, b) · ∇ϕ(x)− ℓ(x, b)} ≤ 0 (resp. ≥ 0), i.e.
the equation holds with the ”right” sign.
Under general hypotheses (on the regularity of Ω, and
some ”compatibility conditions” for the exit-cost ψ), the
value function is characterized as the unique bounded uni-
formly continuous viscosity solution of the boundary value
problem for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (note that
if Ω is IRm, then there are not boundary conditions).
Now we consider a differential game with state equation
y′(t) = f(y(t), α(t), β(t)), y(0) = x,
and cost functional
J(x, α, β) =
∫ +∞
0
e−tℓ(y(t), α(t), β(t))dt,
for the infinite horizon case (i.e. without restriction to Ω), or
J(x, α, β) =
∫ tx(α,β)
0
e−tℓ(y(t), α(t), β(t))dt+
+ e−tx(α,β)ψ(y(t)),
(6)
for the exit-time problem. The measurable control α ∈ A =
{α : [0,+∞[→ A, measurable} is governed by the first
player who wants to minimize the cost, whereas and the
second player, by choosing the measurable control β ∈ B =
{β : [0,+∞[→ B, measurable}, wants to maximize the
cost. We define the non-anticipative strategies (see, e.g., [9])
for the first player
Γ =
{
γ : B → A, β 7→ γ[β]
∣∣∣β1 = β2 in [0, s] =⇒
γ[β1] = γ[β2] in [0, s]} .
(7)
Hence the (lower) value function for the minimiza-
tion/maximization problem is defined as
V (x) = min
γ∈Γ
max
β∈B
J(x, γ[β], β).
Under rather general hypothesis, the value function V is the
unique bounded uniformly continuous viscosity solution of
the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation
V (x) + min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{−f(x, a, b) · ∇V (x)− ℓ(x, a, b)} = 0,
which also in this case must be coupled with appropriate
boundary conditions for the exit-time problem.
II. SOLUTION APPROACH
We will pursue the idea of decomposing the infinite
horizon (1) into a finite horizon problem with σ(t) = 0
and an infinite infinite horizon problem with σ(t) = 1 as
expressed below
J(ζ, u(.), w(.)) = [
∫ T
0
g˜(z(t), u(t), w(t))dt+∫∞
T
e−tgˆ(z(t), u(t), w(t))dt].
(8)
We can do such a decomposition as once the state enters the
target T it will remain in it for the rest of the time [2].
Let us now explain more in details the notion of optimality
of a saturated control mentioned in Problem 1. Let U and
W be the sets of measurable controls and demands as in the
Introduction (after equation (3)), and let Γ be the set of non-
anticipative strategies for the player 1 (see (7), replacing B
by W , A by U , and β by u). The (lower) value function for
the differential game is then
V (ζ) = inf
γ∈Γ
sup
w∈W
J(ζ, γ[w], w),
where ζ is the initial state. Now, V must be the unique vis-
cosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation
σV (ζ) +H(ζ,∇V (ζ)) = 0, (9)
where the Hamiltonian H is, for every (ζ, p) ∈ IRm × IRm:
H(ζ, p) := min
ω∈W
max
µ∈U
{−(µ−Dω) · p− gσ(ζ, µ, ω)}. (10)
Observe that the above equation depends on function gσ(.)
and on σ. Hence when dealing with the infinite horizon σ =
1 and so in the left hand side of the equation there is the
presence of the addend +V (ζ). We can look at the saturated
control as a special non anticipative strategy γ0, namely, for
every w ∈W we define
γ0[w](t) = sat[u−,u+](−kz),
where z is the state trajectory of (2) under the saturated
control as choice for u and under the choice of w. Given
this, we wish to find a function gσ(.) such that the worst cost
returned by the saturated control equals the value function
V . This corresponds to imposing
V˜ (ζ) := sup
w∈W
J(ζ, γ0[w], w) = V (ζ),
i.e. we get the robust optimality of the saturated control if
V˜ = V, (11)
where V˜ is obtained by maximizing over w
J˜(ζ, w) =
∫ T
0
e−σ(t)tgσ(z(t), sat[u−,u+](−kz(t)), w(t))dt,
(in the infinite horizon the extremes are T and ∞) subject
to the controlled dynamics
z˙(t) = sat[u−,u+](−kz(t))−Dw(t), z(0) = ζ (or z(T ) = ζ).
Now, V˜ must be the unique viscosity solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HB) equation:
σV˜ (ζ) + H˜(ζ,∇V˜ (ζ)) = 0, (12)
where the Hamiltonian H˜ is, for every (ζ, p) ∈ IRm × IRm
H˜(ζ, p) := minω∈W{−(sat[u−,u+](−kζ)−Dω) · p+
−gσ(ζ, sat[u−,u+](−kζ), ω)}.
In the following, we will look for suitable cost g in
order to get the optimality of the saturated control for the
corresponding problems. We will prove such an optimality
(i.e. (11)) in two different ways: i) directly computing the
functions V , V˜ and checking their equality, 2) writing the
two corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equations and checking
they have the same unique solution.
Remark 1: A trivial choice is gσ(ζ, µ, ω) = |sat(−kζ)−
µ|. It penalizes any control u different from the saturated
control. However, such a choice makes the game (and the
mathematical problem) without interest.
III. MINIMUM TIME PROBLEM OUTSIDE THE TARGET SET
Let us start by observing that we can always choose g˜(.)
big enough in comparison with gˆ(.) such that, for all u and
w, the second contribution
∫∞
T
gˆ(z(t), u(t), w(t))dt in (1)
can be neglected if compared with the first contribution∫ T
0
g˜(z(t), u(t), w(t))dt. In particular this is true if we
choose g˜(ζ, µ, ω) = M with M > 0 big enough. With the
above choice the problem outside the target T is equivalent
to a minimum time problem with g˜(ζ, µ, ω) ≡ 1. With this in
mind, take without loss of generality U = {µ ∈ IRm
∣∣∣− 1 ≤
µi ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, ..,m}, W = {ω ∈ IR
n
∣∣∣− 1 ≤ ωj ≤ 1 ∀j =
1, ..., n}, and D an m × n matrix satisfying U ⊃ DW .
We denote by Dij the entries of the matrix. The target
is T = {ξ ∈ IRm
∣∣∣|ξi| ≤ (1/k) ∀i = 1, ...,m}, and the
saturated control policy is u(t) = sat[−1,1](−kz(t)). Hence,
the two Hamiltonians become, for all ζ, p ∈ IRm (recall that
we are considering g˜ ≡ 1),
H(ζ, p) = −
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
piDij
∣∣∣∣∣+
m∑
i=1
|pi| − 1,
H˜(ζ, p) = −
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
piDij
∣∣∣∣∣−
m∑
i=1
sat[−1,1](−kζi)pi − 1
(13)
By our hypotheses, the controllable set is IRn \ T , and
hence V and V˜ are, respectively, the unique solutions of{
H(ζ,∇V (ζ)) = 0 in IRn \ T
V = 0 on ∂T ;{
H˜(ζ,∇V˜ (ζ)) = 0 in IRn \ T
V˜ = 0 on ∂T ;
(14)
The question is then to prove that such two problems have
the same solution (note that we do not a priori know V and
V˜ ). Anyway, in this case, due to the structure of the system
and to other hypotheses, we can easy guess that the saturated
control is an optimal choice for player 1. Indeed, since,
whatever w(t) is, for every i-th component, (Dw(t))i cannot
change the sign of sat[−1,1](−kzi(t))− (Dw(t))i (when the
initial point satisfies |ζi| > (1/k)), and since that is the “good
sign” for steering ζ to the target, then any controller will use
such a control (or non anticipative strategy).
In the light of the above considerations, for the value
function, it is reasonable to consider the following expression
V (ζ) = max
i=1,...,m
{
max
{
0, |ζi| −
1
k
}
1−
∑n
j=1 |Dij |
}
. (15)
That is V is the time requested for steering all the compo-
nents in the interval [−1/k, 1/k], under the worst scenario
concerning the demand w.
Let i∗ be the solution of the above maximization (the last
component to reach the target set), the generic component
of the costate is pi∗ = 11−∑n
j=1 |Di∗j |
and pj = 0 for all
j 6= i∗. The optimal choice for w is wj = sign(Di∗j).
It is easy to check that the two Hamilton-Jacobi problems
in (14) are both satisfied by (15) where such a function is
differentiable. On the other hand, on the points where it is
not differentiable (i.e. the point where the maximizing index
in (15) changes), the definition of viscosity solution applies.
We can also note that, on such points of non-differentiability
(which are located on some portion of hyperplanes), we can
only have test function ϕ such that V − ϕ has a minimum,
and also that the i-th component of the gradient ∇ϕ has the
same sign of ζi. Hence the left-hand side of the equations in
(14) are the same (see also (13)).
It must be noted that while the saturated control is unique
optimal for the component i∗, this is no longer true for all
the other components j 6= i∗. Actually, all zj with j 6= i∗
once reached the target may exit and enter again several times
following an infinite number of different trajectories and this
until also zi∗ reaches the target set.
IV. A “QUADRATIC COST” WITHIN THE TARGET SET
Within the target set we consider the following quadratic
cost depending on ζ, µ, ω for fixed k > 0:
gˆ(ζ, µ, ω) =
k + 1
2
‖ζ+
Dω
k
‖2+
1
2k
‖µ−Dω‖2+C‖D(ω−ω¯)‖2,
where, ‖ · ‖ is the euclidean norm in IRn, ω ∈ W is a
generic vertex, a-priori chosen, of W and C ≥ 0 is a suitable
constant, which will be fixed later. Our guess is that, inside
the target T , the saturated control is the unique optimal
strategy for the min-max problem related to the cost gˆ(.),
and suitable exit-cost from the closed set T .
Since we are decoupling the initial problem in two prob-
lems, outside and inside the target T , in this section we may
consider the infinite horizon problem with initial time T = 0.
First of all, let us consider the maximization problem over
w ∈W , with control u equal to the linear saturated one:
V˜ (ζ) = sup
w∈w
∫ ∞
0
e−tgˆ(z(t),−kz(t), ω),
subject to z˙(t) = −kz(t)−Dω, z(0) = ζ ∈ T .
(16)
Note that here we are not imposing an exit cost from T .
Indeed, it is without meaning in this case since, whichever
the control w is, the trajectory can not exit from T .
We now specialize the constant C ≥ 0 in the definition of
the cost gˆ. We choose a vertex ω of W , and C ≥ 0 such that,
for all ζ ∈ T , the maximum over ω ∈ W of the expression
2k + 1
2
∥∥∥∥ζ + Dωk
∥∥∥∥
2
−ζ ·
Dω
k
+
Dω
k
·
Dω
k
+C‖D(ω− ω¯)‖2,
(17)
is always taken in −ω (note that the first addendum of such
expression is just the sum of the two first addenda of g when
µ = −kζ). This is possible by choosing ω equal to one of
the two opposite vertices which strictly maximize the norm
of Dω (which exist since we may suppose the matrix D have
positive entries), and then taking C such that
C ≥ maxζ∈T ,ω∈vertW,ω 6=−ω
2k+1
k
(
‖ζ+ Dωk ‖
2
−‖ζ−Dω2 ‖
2
)
+
4‖Dω‖2−‖Dω−Dω‖2
−ζ·(Dω+Dω)+
Dω·(Dω+Dω)
k2 .
(18)
Now, if we fix w(t) ≡ −ω for all t, then, since u(t) =
−kz(t), the trajectory is given by
z(t) = e−kt
(
ζ −
Dω
k
)
+
Dω
k
.
Hence, the cost associated to such a choice of w is (after
simple calculation)
J˜(ζ) =
1
2
∥∥∥∥ζ − Dωk
∥∥∥∥
2
+ 4C‖Dω‖2,
We guess, not surprisingly, that J˜ is indeed the value
function V˜ of the maximization problem. This can be done,
for instance, by proving that J˜ solves the corresponding
Hamilton-Jacobi equation
J˜(ζ)+min
ω∈W
{
−(−kζ −Dω) · ∇J˜ω(ζ)− gˆ(ζ,−kζ, ω)
}
= 0.
(19)
This can be easily checked, since J˜ is differentiable and
hence a classical solution of (19) (when we put the gradient
of J˜ inside the equation, by the hypothesis about the max-
imization of (17) we immediately get that the minimum in
the left-hand side is reached in −ω, and hence we conclude).
By uniqueness of the solution of (19), J˜ must coincide with
the value function V˜ .
We now consider the differential game, subject to (2), with
running cost gˆ, and exit-cost from T given by
ψ(ζ) =
1
2
‖ζ −
Dω
k
‖2 + 4C‖Dω‖2,
Following the solution approach explained in Section II,
we guess that the (lower) value function V for such a
problem, coincides with the function V˜ = J˜ already found.
By the general results, as explained in the Introduction,
the lower value function V is the unique bounded continuous
viscosity solution of the boundary value problem


V (ζ) + min
ω∈W
max
µ∈U
{−(µ−Dω) · ∇V (ζ)+
−gˆ(ζ, µ, ω)} = 0 in T ,
V = ψ on ∂T ,
(20)
where the boundary condition are in the viscosity sense.
If now we specialize a little bit more the constant C ≥ 0
in the definition of gˆ, we may get that V˜ is also a solution
of (20) (note that it satisfies the boundary condition in the
classical way, and hence also in the viscosity sense). This is
possible by the following observations. Let us put V˜ (which
is differentiable) and its gradient in (20). For every ω ∈ W ,
let µω ∈ U reach the maximum in the left-hand side. Now,
note that our condition on C is only a lower bound. Hence
we may take C larger than its lower bound. In particular,
since, for every ζ ∈ T , µ ∈ U , ω ∈ W , the difference
|gˆ(ζ,−kζ, ω)− gˆ(ζ, µ, ω)|, which is
1
2k
∣∣∣‖kζ +Dω‖2 − ‖µ−Dω‖2∣∣∣ ,
is small of order 1/k, we can take C a little bit larger than
its lower bound such that it is also true that, for every ζ ∈ T ,
the minimum with respect to ω ∈ W of the expression
−(µω −Dω) · ∇V (ζ)− g(ζ, µω, ω),
is taken in −ω. But, as standard calculations show, the only
possibility is µ−ω = −kζ and hence V˜ solves (20). By
uniqueness, we then get V˜ = V , and u(t) = −kz(t) is
the unique possibility for optimality.
Remark 2: Argument of future works is searching a suit-
able running cost gˆ which leaves the demand free to switch
(at least) between two opposite vertices.
V. A CONSERVATIVE APPROXIMATION
In this section, we propose a conservative approach that
allows us to solve the original problem without decomposing
it into the finite an infinite horizon problem. Let us split
the demand w(t) into m independent demands w(i)(t) each
one acting on a different component. This corresponds to
considering m decoupled one-dimensional dynamics of type
z˙i(t) = ui(t)−
n∑
j=1
Dijw
(i)
j (t).
In the rest of the section, we focus on the one dimensional
version of our problem and drop the index i where possible.
In the one dimensional context, it is natural to think (and
we will prove it in the sequel, for a suitable cost) that the
optimal choice for the player 2 is to use
w(t) = −sign(z(t)) arg max
ω
|
n∑
j=1
Dijωj | ∈ [−1, 1]
n, (21)
where, if z(t) = 0, then w(t) may be any value from
[−1, 1]n. Now, consider the following objective function
g(ζ, µ) = max{|sat[−1,1](−kζ)|, |µ|},
and the corresponding infinite horizon game with cost
J(ζ, u(.), w(.)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−tg(z(t), u(t))dt,
where e−t is a given discount term. We want to show that
the saturated strategy, is the optimal one for the first player.
Hence, first of all, let us prove the (non surprising) optimality
of (21) for the second player in the corresponding maximiz-
ing optimal control problem when u(t) = sat[−1,1](−kz(t)),
that is when the cost is just equal to |sat[−1,1](−kz(t))|.
Defining c =
∑n
j=1 |Dij |, the system is (recall 0 < c < 1)
z˙(t) = sat[−1,1](−kz(t))+ c(sign(z(t))), z(0) = ζ. (22)
Let us suppose −(1/k) ≤ ζ < 0. Then the trajectory is
(recall that if z(t) ∈ [−(1/k), 0[, then sat[−1,1](−kz(t)) =
−kz(t), and sign(z(t)) = −1)
z(t) = e−kt
(
ζ +
c
k
)
−
c
k
∀t ≥ 0
Note that such a trajectory is always negative and hence it
is exactly the solution of the system (22) with the second
member given by −kz(t) − c. Moreover, observe that it is
increasing if ζ < −(c/k) and decreasing if −(c/k) < ζ <
0. Hence, in any case, it converges (for t → +∞) to the
equilibrium −(c/k). Note that such an equilibrium point is
just obtained from (cωζ)/k when ωζ = −1, that is when ωζ
solves the problem ωζ(cζ) = maxω∈[−1,1] ω(cζ). The cost
of such a controlled trajectory is
V˜ (ζ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−t(−kz(t))dt =
k(c− ζ)
k + 1
Let us note that V˜ has a continuous derivative in
[−()1/k), 0[, given by the negative constant V˜ ′(ζ) ≡
−k/(k + 1). Moreover we have that V˜ (ζ) → kc
k+1 , for
ζ → 0− and V˜ (ζ) → kc+1
k+1 , for ζ →
−
1 k.
If instead ζ ≤ −(1/k), then the system has the right hand
side equal to 1 − c until z reaches the value −(1/k) and
after, again, equal to −kz − c. Since the reaching time is
τ = −(kζ + 1)/(k − kc), dividing the system in the two
intervals of time [0, τ ] (with initial point ζ), and [τ,+∞]
(with initial point −(1/k)), we obtain the trajectory
z(t) =


ζ + (1− c)t 0 ≤ t ≤ τ,
e−kt+kτ
(
c− 1
k
)
−
c
k
Again, such a trajectory is increasing and converges to
−(c/k). The corresponding cost and cost derivative in ] −
∞,−(1/k)[ are
V˜ (ζ) = −e−τ (1− c)
k
k + 1
+ 1, V˜ (ζ)′ = e−τ
k
k + 1
.
Note that V˜ is then continuous and derivable, since V˜ (ζ) →
kc+1
k+1 , for ζ → −
1
k
−
and V˜ (ζ)′ → − k
k+1 , for ζ → −
1
k
−
.
If instead ζ > 0, a similar analysis as before gives
V˜ (ζ) = k
k+1 (ζ + c) 0 < ζ < (1/k)
V˜ (ζ) = −e−τ (1− c)
k
k + 1
+ 1 (1/k) ≤ ζ,
where τ = (1 − kζ)/(k − kc) is the reaching time of the
value 1/k. Also in this case c/k is an attracting equilibrium
point. Then, the value V˜ is continuous and derivable in ]−
∞, 0[∪]0,+∞[. Moreover, it is continuous in ζ = 0 where
it is equal to kc/(k + 1) but is not derivable in ζ = 0.
The left limit of derivatives is −k/(k+1) whereas the right
limit is k/k+1. Hence, in the view of the viscosity solutions
approach, we can say that there are not test functions ϕ such
that V˜ − ϕ has a local maximum in ζ = 0, whereas the set
of the derivatives in ζ = 0 of all test functions ϕ such that
V˜ − ϕ has a local minimum in ζ = 0 is exactly the interval
[−k/(k + 1), k/(k + 1)].
The function V˜ is the optimal value for the problem of
maximizing, among w ∈W , the following cost
J˜(ζ, w(.)) =
∫ ∞
0
|sat[−1,1](−kz(t))|dt,
subject to the dynamics
z˙(t) = sat[−1,1](−kz(t))− cw(t), z(0) = ζ,
if and only if it is a viscosity solution in IR of the problem
V˜ (ζ) + min
ω∈[−1,1]
{−(sat[−1,1](−kζ)− cω)V˜ (ζ)
′ +
−|sat[−1,1](−kζ)|} = 0
Here we do not have boundary conditions since the problem
is not restricted to a subset, but it is treated in the whole
IR. A direct calculation shows that V˜ is a viscosity solution.
Now we guess that V˜ is also a viscosity solution of the Isaacs
equation for the differential game given by the cost
J(ζ, u(.), w(.)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−t max{|sat[−1,1](−kz(t))|, |u(t)|}dt
subject to the dynamics (2). Hence, we have to prove that V˜
is a viscosity solution of
V˜ (ζ)+ minω∈[−1,1] maxµ∈[−1,1]{−(µ− cω)V˜ (ζ)
′ +
−max(|sat[−1,1](−kζ)|, |µ|)} = 0
and hence we will get, by uniqueness, that it is equal to the
lower value function of the game.
To this end, we have to split the analysis in the following
cases: a) ζ < −(1/k), b) −(1/k) ≤ ζ < 0, c) ζ = 0, d)
0 < ζ ≤ 1/k, e) ζ > 1/k. A careful analysis of all these
cases brings the desired result, and also the fact that the linear
saturated control is the unique optimal choice for the first
player. In particular, outside the target, the optimal choice
for the first player is µ = 1 if ζ < 0 (µ = −1 if ζ > 0)
which is exactly the linear saturated control, and corresponds
to the optimal choice for a minimum time problem.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
Consider dynamics x˙ = Bu−w where B is the incidence
matrix of the network with n = 5 nodes and m = 9 arcs
in Fig. 1. Table I lists the upper bounds on u (lower bounds
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3
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5
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1
2
5
6
4
7
9
3
Fig. 1. Example of a system with 5 nodes and 9 arcs.
are all 0), the demand bounds, and the long–term average
demands. Now, given the nominal demand w¯ = [0 1 2 1 1]
and the nominal balancing flow u¯ = [1 1 1 0 0 1 1 3 2]′ ∈ U
(which is w¯ = Bu¯) we translate the variables by setting
δu
.
= u − u¯ and δw = w − w¯. We choose matrix D as
in (40) of [2], obtained via constraint generation, (see [2]
Section 5.2). We simulate the system under the saturated
linear state feedback control (5) (we initialize x(0) = 0,
y(0) = 0, and set k = 4). The time plot of z(t) in Fig. 2
shows that z(t) converges to the interval [−δu+/k,−δu−/k]
(dotted line in Fig. 2).
arcs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
upper bounds 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
nodes 1 2 3 4 5
upper bounds 0 2 3 2 2
averages 0 1 2 1 1
TABLE I
CONTROLLED FLOWS CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND BOUNDS
0 100 200 300 400 500
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0
0.5
z 1
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
z 2
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
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0
0.5
z 3
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
−0.95
−0.275
0.4
z 4
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
−0.95
−0.275
0.4
z 5
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
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0
0.5
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time
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time
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time
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time
Fig. 2. The variable z(t) with saturated linear feedback control (5) with
k = 4.
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